Investment Committee Note
In our last issue we examined the inflation dragon and the structural forces driving power demand from AI infrastructure build-out. This issue turns to employment. The obvious fear is mass displacement — the concern that AI tools will automate away the jobs that underpin household income, consumer demand and social cohesion. But our committee spent considerable time on the alternative scenario: what if employment holds steady, and AI simply makes every worker vastly more productive?
The provocation came from Dylan Patel, Founder and Chief Analyst of SemiAnalysis, widely regarded as the leading independent authority on the semiconductor supply chain and AI infrastructure. Patel has argued that advanced AI tooling can allow a single person to do the work of five to fifteen people — a productivity multiplier that, for this analysis, we anchor at 8x as a working scenario. The question we put to our committee was direct: if the United States remained at full employment (approximately 4.5% unemployment) and every employed worker delivered eight times their current output, what would the macroeconomic landscape look like?
I. Calibrating the Productivity Claim
The 8x figure is striking but not without empirical grounding. Actual productivity research to date spans a wide range:
| Study / Source | Productivity Gain Observed | Task / Sector |
|---|---|---|
| Stanford / Brynjolfsson et al. | +14% output per hour | Customer-service agents with AI |
| GitHub Copilot (Microsoft) | +55% tasks completed | Software development |
| Goldman Sachs Research | +25–50% in high-exposure roles | Knowledge workers broadly |
| Human-AI ad teams (Ju & Aral, 2025) | +73% per worker | Advertising copy creation |
| St. Louis Federal Reserve (2025) | +1.1% aggregate U.S. output | Cross-sector, partial adoption |
| SemiAnalysis (Patel) | 5–15x effective headcount | Agentic coding / engineering |
The empirical studies measure partial adoption across heterogeneous task types. Patel's 5–15x claim reflects agentic AI — where models execute multi-step workflows autonomously — in highly codified knowledge work such as software engineering. The 8x anchor sits inside his stated range and represents a scenario in which agentic AI tools mature and diffuse broadly across the economy. It is not today's reality; it is a near-horizon strategic possibility our committee believes warrants serious analysis.
II. The Full-Employment + 8x Framework
The United States currently employs approximately 163 million workers at a GDP of roughly $30 trillion. Under our scenario, we hold employment constant and ask: what is the economic output of a labour force producing at eight times its current rate of useful output?
Classical economic frameworks treat productivity growth as the primary driver of long-run GDP. Robert Solow's growth model makes this explicit: output per worker, compounded through capital deepening and technological change, is the engine of rising living standards. An 8x multiplier applied to the existing labour stock would represent the largest per-capita productivity shock in recorded economic history, dwarfing the productivity gains from electrification (estimated at 1–2% per annum over several decades) and the internet era.
Crucially, because employment remains intact, aggregate demand does not collapse. Wages can rise in line with productivity, sustaining consumer spending even as unit costs of production fall dramatically. This combination — expanding supply capacity alongside intact consumer purchasing power — is the hallmark of the most benign macroeconomic scenarios economists can model.
III. Predicted Macroeconomic Outcomes
A. Inflation Would Plummet
In our previous issue, we described the forces currently releasing the inflation dragon from its cage — structural energy constraints, deglobalisation, deficit spending and the capital intensity of AI infrastructure build-out. The question our committee now poses is whether AI-derived productivity growth is, in fact, the inflation dragon slayer.
The argument is compelling. When supply expands faster than demand, prices fall. In our scenario, every unit of goods and services can be produced with a fraction of the previous labour input, radically compressing unit costs across virtually every sector. The Bank for International Settlements has modelled AI-driven productivity shocks and found that broad-based supply-side gains produce sustained disinflation, particularly in sectors with high AI exposure such as healthcare, professional services and manufacturing. The IMF's Global Integrated Monetary and Fiscal Model similarly projects that a high-TFP growth scenario results in a disinflationary impulse in the short-to-medium term.
The historical parallel is instructive. The technology-driven productivity surge of the 1990s held inflation below 3% throughout one of the longest expansions in U.S. history, even as unemployment fell to near-record lows and wages rose. An 8x productivity multiplier would represent a supply-side force orders of magnitude more powerful than that episode. Rather than stoking the inflation dragon further, it points toward a structurally lower price level over time. For the infrastructure assets our committee evaluates, this matters: real returns on long-duration assets improve materially in a lower-inflation environment, while financing costs ease — even as the underlying economy expands at an accelerating pace.
B. GDP Growth at Unprecedented Scale
Current consensus projections for AI-driven GDP uplift range from 1.4% (IMF low scenario) to nearly 4% (IMF high scenario) cumulatively over a decade. These estimates embed assumptions about partial adoption and slow diffusion. An 8x productivity scenario — with rapid, economy-wide adoption — would sit far above even the most optimistic institutional forecasts.
Penn Wharton's Budget Model estimates that roughly 42% of current U.S. jobs are potentially exposed to AI automation or augmentation. At 8x productivity, each of those roles effectively adds seven additional units of productive capacity to the economy. Using a simple Hulten's-theorem aggregation, the implied GDP uplift over a decade would run into the tens of trillions of dollars. Erkan Erdem and Dileep Birur's CGE modelling (2025) already estimates a $2.48 trillion GDP gain by 2030 under a rapid-adoption scenario — and that uses far more conservative productivity assumptions than 8x.
C. A Wealth Cascade: Profits, Tax Revenue and Consumer Purchasing Power
Perhaps the most underappreciated dimension of the 8x scenario is what happens simultaneously to three interconnected variables: corporate profitability, government tax receipts, and household post-tax income. The dynamic is not zero-sum — it is a cascade, and it runs in one direction.
When firms produce dramatically more output with the same headcount, the spread between revenue and labour cost expands sharply. Unit costs fall — not because wages are cut, but because the same wage now commands eight times the productive output. Corporate margins widen across the economy. Shareholders receive higher dividends. Retained earnings available for reinvestment — into new products, new markets and further AI infrastructure — increase materially. This is not a future abstraction; it is the mechanism already visible in high-AI-exposure technology firms today, where revenue per employee has expanded substantially faster than wage bills.
Rising corporate profits generate a parallel windfall for government revenues. Corporate tax receipts expand in proportion to profitability. Simultaneously, if wages rise in line with productivity — as classical economics predicts in a competitive labour market — income tax and payroll tax revenues also grow. Governments operating in this environment would find themselves with substantially greater fiscal capacity: the ability to invest in infrastructure, to reduce debt burdens accumulated during prior fiscal cycles, or to lower tax rates while maintaining or increasing absolute revenue. The fiscal arithmetic of the 8x scenario is almost uniformly positive for sovereign balance sheets.
For households, the picture is equally constructive. Wages rise. The cost of goods and services falls as deflationary supply forces work through the economy. Real post-tax income — what a family can actually buy — rises on both sides of the equation simultaneously. This dynamic, higher nominal income combined with lower prices, is historically rare. It defined the most prosperous decades of the twentieth century and the best years of the technology-driven 1990s. At 8x productivity, it would occur at a pace and scale that those episodes could not approach.
IV. Innovation and Healthcare: Where the Multiplier Bites Deepest
Not all productivity gains are equal. In commodity industries, 8x output simply means more goods at lower cost. But in innovation-intensive fields — software, scientific research, drug discovery — an 8x multiplier on human cognitive output is transformative in a qualitatively different way. It does not just produce more of the same; it unlocks capabilities that were previously unreachable within practical time and cost constraints.
AI in Drug Discovery: Selected Indicators (2025–2026)
AlphaFold's protein-structure predictions now match near-experimental accuracy, cutting years from target identification cycles.
Eli Lilly signed a deal valued at up to $2.75 billion with Insilico Medicine for AI-discovered drug candidates.
By 2025, an estimated 30% of new drug candidates were identified with AI assistance — up from near-zero in 2020.
AI is projected to generate $350–$410 billion annually in pharmaceutical sector value by end of 2025.
The traditional drug-to-clinic timeline (10 years, $2.5B+, 90% failure rate) is being materially compressed.
The $4.9 trillion healthcare industry is deploying AI at more than twice the rate of the broader economy.
In a full-employment, 8x productivity world, the implications for healthcare extend beyond drug discovery. Every diagnostic function, every clinical trial design, every regulatory submission and every patient pathway could be optimised at a speed and scale that is genuinely without historical precedent. Diseases that currently take decades to characterise and treat — neurodegenerative conditions, rare cancers, antimicrobial-resistant infections — become tractable problems for augmented research teams operating at multiples of today's cognitive throughput.
There is, however, a second-order economic consequence that our committee believes receives insufficient attention: the relationship between extended human life expectancy and GDP. Academic research, including landmark work published in the Journal of Political Economy, has established that increases in life expectancy generate significant population and labour-supply effects. A 1% increase in life expectancy is associated with a 1.7–2% increase in population over time. In a world where demographic decline is already constraining growth across developed economies, this is not a minor variable.
If AI-accelerated medical research meaningfully extends healthy working life — compressing the onset of age-related cognitive and physical decline, curing diseases that currently remove prime-age workers from the labour force, and extending the productive years of older workers — the effect on GDP is compounding. Every additional year of healthy productive life added to the average worker is, in economic terms, an expansion of the effective labour supply without any additional births or immigration required. In economies already facing population-driven growth headwinds, this is one of the most powerful long-run GDP multipliers imaginable.
The same logic applies to climate technology, materials science, energy systems and infrastructure engineering — all fields directly relevant to Monard's investment universe. The bottleneck in each is not capital; it is the rate at which human minds can process complexity. An 8x multiplier on that cognitive throughput changes the calculus fundamentally.
V. Constraints, Caveats and the Realistic Path
Our committee is not in the business of uncritical optimism. Several structural constraints would modulate the 8x scenario in practice:
| Constraint | Detail |
|---|---|
| Measurement lag | GDP accounting does not yet capture AI-generated output well. As Dylan Patel and Malcolm Spittler noted in their May 2026 SemiAnalysis paper, the Solow paradox recurs — productivity gains may be real but statistically invisible for years. |
| Uneven diffusion | Benefits will concentrate initially in knowledge-intensive, high-exposure sectors. Physical labour, field services and low-digitisation industries will see smaller near-term gains. |
| Organisational friction | Firms must redesign workflows, retrain workers and integrate AI tooling into operations. History of prior general-purpose technologies (electrification, internet) suggests this takes 10–20 years for full economic expression. |
| Regulatory overhang | Healthcare and regulated infrastructure carry compliance regimes that may slow the deployment of AI-augmented decision-making even when the capability exists. |
| Energy and infrastructure | As our prior issue addressed, the compute required to sustain 8x cognitive throughput at scale implies enormous sustained demand for power — directly relevant to the behind-the-meter industrial power markets in which Monard operates. |
Even at half the multiplier — 4x — the economic implications would be historically extraordinary. The empirical evidence already confirms that early-adopting, high-AI-exposure industries are driving measurable productivity gains: AI-exposed sectors contributed approximately 1.7 percentage points of U.S. labour productivity growth in 2025 alone according to Morgan Stanley industry-level data. The trajectory is clear; the magnitude and speed of diffusion is the open question.
So, What's Around the Corner?
Our committee's view is that the doomsday narrative — mass job losses, hollowed-out communities, collapsed consumer demand — is not the winning argument. It mistakes the direction of travel. History does not suggest that transformative productivity technologies destroy economies; it suggests they restructure them, often in ways that are disruptive at the margin but overwhelmingly positive in aggregate. The industrial revolution, electrification, computing — none eliminated work. All redefined it.
What we believe is coming is a mixture: some job displacement in highly automatable roles, offset by a larger and more durable wave of productivity-augmented employment. As companies learn what AI tooling genuinely delivers — not from vendor promises but from operational experience — rational management will increasingly opt to grow revenue and profit with the workforce they have, rather than simply cut headcount. A firm whose employees are eight times more productive can compete in markets it could not previously reach, serve customers it could not previously afford to serve, and build products it could not previously resource.
The macroeconomic consequences flow from that premise. Corporate profits rise. Dividends grow. Tax revenues expand. Real household incomes increase on both sides — higher wages, lower prices. Medical research accelerates, extending healthy productive life and creating a GDP multiplier that conventional demographic models have not yet priced in.
What is around the corner is not the automation apocalypse. We believe it is the beginning of a productivity-led expansion whose full dimensions we are only starting to measure, powered — in every literal sense of the word — by infrastructure being built right now. The fear of a jobless future is unwarranted and without historical precedent. No transformative technology in the modern era has permanently destroyed net employment, and there is no compelling reason to believe AI will be the first. The more important question is not whether jobs survive, but whether we are building the infrastructure to power the economy that not only replaces, but greatly enhances, the old one.
This publication is produced by Monard Infrastructure Inc. for informational purposes only and is intended solely for distribution to the firm's investors and manufacturing partners. It does not constitute financial, investment, legal or tax advice, and should not be relied upon as the basis for any investment decision. Past performance is not indicative of future results. All views expressed are those of the Monard Investment Committee at the time of publication and are subject to change without notice. Recipients should seek independent professional advice before making any investment. Monard Infrastructure Inc. is not a registered investment adviser.
Statistics sourced from SemiAnalysis, Stanford/Brynjolfsson et al., GitHub/Microsoft, Goldman Sachs Research, St. Louis Federal Reserve, Penn Wharton Budget Model, Bank for International Settlements, IMF, Morgan Stanley, Journal of Political Economy, Society of Actuaries Research Institute, Erdem & Birur (2025), Insilico Medicine, Eli Lilly, AlphaFold/DeepMind.